I write a blog that focuses on public information, public health, and policy: https://pimento-mori.ghost.io/

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Joined 6 months ago
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Cake day: June 24th, 2025

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  • Earlier this year, The Intercept wrote about surveillance contractors sought by ICE, who would be expected to perform algorithm- and AI-aided deep dives into social media users’ post histories, searching for, among other things, “proclivity for violence,” which could include “empathy with a group which has violent tendencies,” among other things. Hope you haven’t expressed “empathy” at any point for any group with “violent tendencies,” right? How does it feel to know that you’d be at the mercy of a freelance surveillance contractor’s mastery of “social and behavioral sciences” and “psychological profiles,” according to ICE’s statement of objectives?

    How fucking creepy is it to think about this psychological manipulation pre-crime bullshit and take into account that one of the briefings released yesterday took note of people in New Orleans seeming especially disturbed by videos with the sound of crying children.

    Officials track public sentiment, noting negative impact of ‘videos with sounds of children crying’ as parents arrested

    It seems very unlikely this is being noted in order to answer questions like “How do we tone it down a bit and keep things from boiling over?”

    Imo (and obviously feel free to take that with a grain of salt since I’m totally “overly-paranoid” about how evil these people are and the levels they would stoop to) it seems more likely this is to answer a question of “How do we use psychological warfare against the American people and send them closer to their breaking point?”






  • Ukraine’s defense relies increasingly on huge volumes of civilian data stored on cloud platforms. An adversary’s military may supply their targeting algorithm with an individual’s location, health, and online behavior. Military actors regularly mine, analyze, and repurpose social media posts.

    It is not clear, however, that the deep learning systems integral to some of these new weapons can overcome the fog of war. These systems treat all data as objective representations of reality, when in fact information drawn from social media platforms is shaped by users’ emotional and cognitive experiences in ways that can skew its utility for wartime intelligence. The “learned knowledge” generated by analytic systems is probabilistic, not causal—leading to the risk that algorithms are “enforc[ing] their version of ‘reality’ from patterns and probabilities derived from data.”

    These venture-backed firms view contemporary conflicts as live testing grounds.

    Global digital platforms such as TikTok and Telegram illustrate the wider environment in which these dependencies are forming. Though neither company develops military technologies, both shape the information environment surrounding war. TikTok’s recommendation algorithm influences how audiences perceive the conflict in Ukraine, shaping global narratives and public opinion. Yet its complex ownership structure, rooted in Chinese parent company ByteDance and entangled with global venture capital, has sparked geopolitical concern. … These concerns highlight how platforms created for civilian use can also become entangled in the political and informational dimensions of war.

    The overlapping interests of finance capital and private technology corporations transcend national borders, creating forms of influence that do not fit neatly into binary friend-or-enemy distinctions. ByteDance’s global investment network, spanning Chinese state-linked entities, American private equity funds, and international investors, illustrates this transnational ownership model. It complicates national regulatory and security responses, as policymakers must ask not merely who owns a given platform, but who controls the data, infrastructure, and decisionmaking power that states increasingly depend on.

    This illustrates a deeper shift in the relationship between the market and the military. The problem is not that defense firms are publicly traded—Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics have been for decades—but that contemporary defense-tech companies retain proprietary control over data-driven systems central to military operations. Their technologies are not merely delivered to the state; the companies are embedded in the decisionmaking architecture of warfare. When a firm’s market value depends on its perceived wartime success, its incentives may diverge from those of the state it ostensibly serves. This intertwining of commercial strategy, military dependency, and investor confidence represents a new kind of vulnerability for states.

    What is at stake, beyond the conflict itself, is the nature of state sovereignty. The ability of states to govern, defend, and act independently is increasingly mediated by private technology firms and global finance. This is not entirely new. States have long relied on private contractors, but the kind of dependency has changed. Unlike traditional arms manufacturers, today’s defense-tech firms control the digital platforms, data flows, and algorithmic systems that underpin military decisionmaking. At the same time, civilian platforms like Telegram and TikTok shape the informational terrain of conflict, influencing how wars are perceived and fought.

    I just want to make sure I’m understanding this.

    •You have companies like Meta (just an example) working for both sides of a conflict via government contract, but not necessarily bound to either side of a conflict because of global venture capital/transnational ownership model

    •We know Facebook/Meta has been intentionally manipulating the emotions of social media users for over a decade now

    •That social media data is then collected and used to train military platforms, which may be directly or indirectly linked to the social media company

    •These companies very likely have an incentive to create an endless war (and endless profits for themselves) by manipulating the emotions and behavior of social media users, knowing that data will be used to train military platforms

    Basically, a private tech company could manipulate data to give one side of a conflict an advantage over the other, but it could also intentionally pit adversaries against each other in an endless loop by manipulating social media content, and by extension, manipulating the military platforms being trained.

    A company could potentially profit from both sides of a conflict it’s manipulating because the states have turned to it and other big tech companies to help them reach “victory” in the endless conflict the company helped create. Correct?







  • I mean they want a one government, they just want to be the ones in charge of that one government.

    The entire argument is that it’s somehow safer bc it’s a private corporation/business, and not the government. Except it’s a private monopoly protected and contracted by the fucking government!

    The only way that argument could possibly make the slightest bit of sense would be in an imaginary world where there was legitimate competition between other corporations (but if that was the case corporations probably wouldn’t exist) and the American people actually had some say in which private company got government contracts.

    Instead, government officials (who are allegedly the reason we have to turn to private businesses bc we can’t trust the government) are buying stock in private companies, and then handing government contracts to the fucking private companies where they own stock.








  • It’s not that they’re less important. These were very important propositions, but normally the election and proposition boxes are the same size.

    This was an election where an incumbent candidate from a local political family had already done some things that seemed to undermine getting people to vote in the election.

    There is a common misconception in Louisiana that if you have a felony conviction that you cannot vote – this is wrong (check out if you are eligible). Mr. Lombard promised to update the Clerk of Court’s website with the eligibility criteria a potential voter must meet if they have a felony conviction. As of today, the Clerk’s Website fails to share this essential voting information. This is not a great look for the City’s Chief Election Officer.

    Up until September 5, 2025, under Mr. Lombard’s leadership, the Clerk of Court’s website listed wrong dates for the next election, and listed the wrong voter registration deadlines.

    It’s either coincidental incompetence of the guy up for re-election, or more examples of the much bigger problem Louisiana has historically had when it comes to undermining the democratic process.

    Nobody is (usually) standing at polling booths armed in order to intimidate people, but can you really call these passive aggressive attempts to test the boundaries and undermine equal participation “respect” for democracy?














  • Beyond controversy around the Texas self-managed abortion case, Flock has had to respond to evidence that local law enforcement agencies have used their data to assist Immigration and Customs Enforcement. It now has offered assurances that jurisdictions proactively banning data sharing related to immigration status or abortion seeking will be excluded from national searches, as long as the local yahoo with tactical undershorts is dumb enough to put “ICE” or “abortion” in the required reason field.

    But it turns out that once you’ve built a massive distributed surveillance network, it’s hard to rein in its use. The state of Washington explicitly bans sharing data or equipment with federal officers for the purpose of immigration enforcement, yet the University of Washington found dozens of examples of exactly that. Some local departments explicitly opened up their Flock data to the feds despite the state law; others had their information siphoned off without their knowledge via an unspecified technological error.

    The university study and an investigation by 404 Media found another category of information sharing that also subverted state attempts to fend off immigration overreach: federal officers just asking really nice if the local guy could run a search on their behalf and the local guy happened to use “ICE” or “ICE warrant” or “illegal immigration” in the local search (tactical undies recognizes tactical undies, you know?). Worth noting: A local officer well informed about jurisdictional data-sharing limitations would just not enter “ICE” as the reason for the search, and we have no idea how many of those cannier cops there are.

    We have this built in safety net that makes every user list the reason they accessed the data.

    Reason for search: Not ICE

    Checks out.

    Already terrified? It gets worse: Flock is turning over more and more of its monitoring to AI, a feature that Flock (and the entire technology-media industrial complex) sells as a neutral efficiency. But the problem with AI is how deeply human it really is—trained on biased data, it can only replicate and amplify what it already knows. Misogyny and white supremacy are built into surveillance DNA, and using it to search for women seeking abortions or any other suspected “criminal” can only make the echo chamber more intense.

    This month, an AI-powered security system (not Flock, surprisingly) tossed out an alarm to a school resource officer, and he called the police to the scene of a Black teenager eating chips. The teen described “eight cop cars that came pulling up to us [and] they started walking toward me with guns.” You can fault the resource officer for not clocking the chip bag; at least we know the point of failure.